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• Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close
to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which
are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance
their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis.
• Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern
Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits
because: the share of intra-euro trade has declined; intra-euro trade balances have
already adjusted to a great extent; the intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appre-
ciations since 2000; there are only two main current account surplus countries,
Germany and the Netherlands; a purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require
too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern
countries, which do not seem to be feasible. 
• Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to-
balanced current account position.
• The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro
trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports,
growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro
adjustment and the survival of the euro.
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1. In this Policy Contribution
we focus on the initial 12
members of the euro area
(11 original members plus
Greece), because major
external imbalances were
observed among them
during the euro's first
decade.
2. ‘Net international
investment position’ and
’net foreign assets’ (NFA)
refer to the same concept
and could be used
interchangeably.
1 THE QUESTION
The perceived inability of some southern euro-
area members to achieve sustainable external
positions and economic growth inside the euro
area is a major factor behind the euro crisis. Their
trade deficits should be turned to sizeable
surpluses in which real exchange rate
developments should play a role. Some
adjustment, both in trade balances and real
exchange rates, already took place in the past few
years. The question that this Policy Contribution
addresses is: is the remaining adjustment a purely
intra-euro area issue or does the external value of
the euro play a role?
2 EXTERNAL POSITIONS
The 12 initial members of the euro area1 had a
close to balanced aggregate current account
position during at least the past three decades,
which was the result of diverse movements in
individual countries (Figure 1). Current account
deficits and surpluses were also observed before
the creation of the euro. The most salient features,
between 1999 and 2008, were a significant
transition from a current account deficit to a
surplus in Austria and Germany, an increased
surplus in the Netherlands, a broadly stable
surplus in Luxembourg, while in the other eight
countries the current account balance has
gradually deteriorated. The deterioration was
sharpest in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Divergence within a monetary union, such as the
divergence of current account balances, is not
necessarily a bad thing. Capital flows across
regions and the ensuing current account deficits
and surpluses may reflect the better utilisation of
resources when capital moves to fast-growing
regions to the benefit of the whole monetary
union. However, the boom and bust in the Irish and
Spanish housing sectors exemplifies capital
misallocation. And the build-up of ‘excessive’
regional debt is undesirable. 
It is difficult to assess at what level external debt
becomes excessive. The recently created Euro-
pean scoreboard for the surveillance of macro-
economic imbalances (European Commission,
2012) sets an indicative threshold of minus 35
percent of GDP for the net international investment
position (IIP)2. Whether this threshold is reason-
able or not is perhaps a topic for discussion, yet
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Figure 1: Current account balance (% GDP), 1980-2011
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2012 and author's calculations.
there are four euro-area countries, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain, in which the net international
investment position is much worse, close to
minus 100 percent of GDP (Figure 2).
As also emphasised by European Commission
(2012), the composition of foreign assets and
liabilities and their maturities also matter. Foreign
direct investment (FDI) is generally regarded as a
less risky and more stable source of funding
(Furceri et al, 2012), while debt, and in particular
short term debt is riskier. In terms of the
composition of net foreign liabilities, Ireland
differs from Greece, Portugal and Spain: Ireland
has very large net liabilities in equity portfolio
investments and is a creditor of the rest of the
world. The other three countries have large net
debt liabilities (Table 1).
The reasons for the accumulation of net foreign lia-
bilities are similarly important. Ireland again dif-
fers from the other three countries in this respect.
While the Irish net IIP deteriorated by €173 billion
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from 1998 to 2011, the cumulative current
account deficit during this period explains just a
small part of the total, €37 billion. In 2007 Ire-
land’s net IIP was minus €37 billion (19 percent of
GDP) – a reasonable figure – which suddenly
deteriorated to €153 billion (98 percent of GDP)
by 2011 (Figure 2). This sudden deterioration was
mostly the result of valuation changes and is cap-
tured in the last but one line of Table 23. In Greece,
Portugal and Spain, by contrast, the cumulative
current account deficit was of a similar magnitude
to the deterioration of the net IIP. Among the com-
ponents of the current account deficit, the balance
of goods deficit was prominent in these three
countries (Table 2 on the next page). 
Therefore, while Ireland should also aim to
improve her net IIP, the reasonable IIP position
before the crisis suggests that the country will be
better able to do this than Greece, Portugal and
Spain, where external sustainability is a serious
issue. 
(1)=(2)+(3)+(4)
+(5)+(6)+(7)
Net
international
investment
position
(2)
Net foreign
direct
investment
(3)
Net portfolio
investment in
equity
securities
(4)
Net portfolio
investment in
debt
securities
(5)
Net other
investment
(mostly
loans)
(6)
Net ﬁnancial
derivatives
(7)
Reserve
assets
Greece -79 5 6 -10 -84 1 2
Ireland -98 31 -451 264 53 5 1
Portugal -103 -18 -7 -10 -76 -1 10
Spain -92 0 -8 -43 -45 1 3
Table 1: Composition of net international investment position, 2011 (% GDP)
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Source: author’s calculations using data from Eurostat.
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Figure 2: Net international investment position (% GDP), 1980-2011
Source: Eurostat and author's calculations.
3. See Lane (2011) for an
assessment of the sharp
deterioration of Ireland’s
position.
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4. We found that the ULC-
based REER (as calculated
in Darvas 2012a and 2012b
with fixed sectoral weights
for the business sector
excluding agriculture, con-
struction and real estate)
better correlates with
export performance than
the consumer price index-
based REER.
3 EXPORTS AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES
Exports should play a major role in the adjustment
process, which can be facilitated by
improvements in the price and non-price
dimensions of competitiveness. The main tools to
improve non-price competitiveness are structural
reforms, education, innovation and improvements
in corporate governance. Such improvements are
indispensable in most countries, but they require
a long time before they take effect. Price (or cost)
competitiveness can be improved via a
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate
(REER), which is usually measured by the unit
labour cost (ULC) based REER4. Figure 3 shows
that there was a rather strong association between
Time period Indicator Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
1998-2011 (1) Change in net IIP -141 -173 -151 -812
Cu
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19
99
-2
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1
(2) Current account = (2.1)+(2.2)+(2.3)+(2.4) -234 -38 -189 -665
(2.1) Goods -366 382 -220 -696
(2.2) Services 167 -115 61 311
(2.3) Income -73 -303 -67 -239
(2.4) Capital transfers 37 -2 37 -40
(3) Capital account 33 2 25 82
1998-2011
(4) Change in net IIP not due to current and capital
accounts = (1)-(2)-(3)
60 -136 13 -229
2011 (5) GDP 215 156 171 1073
Table 2: Change in net international investment position and the cumulative current and capital
account balances, 1998-2011 (€ billions)
Source: author’s calculations using data from Eurostat.
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Figure 3: Unit labour cost based real exchange rate vs. export performance, before and after 2008Q1
Source: Darvas (2012a) for real exchange rates and author’s calculations for export performance using data from Eurostat and
national statistical offices. Note: Luxembourg is not included due to missing data. An increase in the real exchange rate indi-
cates real appreciation of the ULC-based REER calculated against 30 trading partners (23 EU countries, not including Cyprus,
Luxembourg, Malta and Romania, due to missing data, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and the
United States). The REER considers the business sector excluding construction, real estate and agriculture, and was calculated
using constant 2008Q1 sectoral weights in order to limit the impact of compositional changes on the REER. See Darvas (2012b)
for further details. Export performance is a measure of export market share: the ratio of the volume of exports of goods and
services to the weighted average volume of imports of goods and services of 40 trading partners. The 40 partners include the
30 countries against which the REER-ULC is calculated plus Brazil, Croatia, Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania,
Russia, Switzerland and Ukraine. Export performance is measured as the change from the beginning to the end of the period,
ie from 2000Q1 to 2008Q1 (measured as 2000Q1=100) on the left hand panel and from 2008Q1 to 2011Q4 (measured as
2008Q1=100) on the right hand panel. Since REER changes impact export performance with a lag, we relate export perform-
ance to the average REER during the period considered, ie the average of 2000Q1-2008Q1 (as a percent of 2000Q1 REER) on
the left hand panel and the average of 2008Q1-2011Q4 (as a percent of 2008Q1 REER) on the right hand panel.
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countries and non-EU countries. Italy’s significant
real appreciation also highlights that ULC-REER is
not the only driver of trade balances: while Italy
had the worst export performance out of the euro-
area countries before the crisis (ie the overall
ULC-REER is well correlated with export
performance, as shown by Figure 3), Italy did not
have such huge trade and current account deficits
as eg Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (Figure
1). Domestic demand developments also played a
strong role in driving current accounts. In this
regard European Commission (2009) presented a
very telling chart showing a close relationship
between the change in current account balance
(as a percent of GDP) and the percent change in
housing prices. The latter was influenced by
domestic demand developments.
Since 2008, real exchange rates have adjusted to
a certain extent. Concerning the four euro-area
periphery countries with large net external
liabilities:
• Spain’s intra-euro REER has almost corrected
the pre-crisis increase;
• The increase was not at all high in Portugal (3
percent cumulative increase from 2000Q1 to
2011Q4); 
• We also cannot say that Greece’s REER has
overly appreciated compared to the rest of the
euro area, especially after the recent fall in the
ULC-REER developments and export performance
before the crisis, and a relationship, though
weaker, can also be observed between 2008-
2011. Econometric evidence also supports the
finding that the trade balance and the real
exchange rate are related (eg Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2002). Furthermore, the econometric
results of Gagnon (1996) have also shown that a
deterioration of the net IIP position should be
accompanied by a depreciation of the real
exchange rate.
Consequently, the real exchange rate should have
a major role in fostering the external sustainability
of the four euro-area countries that have close to
minus 100 percent of GDP net IIP. How has the real
exchange rate against major trading partners
evolved so far? While Figure 3 presented a
summary measure of the ULC-based real effective
exchange rate (calculated against the broadest
group of countries), Figure 4 shows quarterly
REER developments from 2000 to 2011
calculated against the three major geographical
groups of trade partners: euro area, non-euro area
EU, and non-EU.
Intra-euro ULC-REERs diverged significantly before
the crisis. Germany was able engineer the greatest
real depreciation, while the biggest real
appreciation was in Italy. Italy also faced the
highest real appreciation against non-euro EU
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Source: Darvas (2012a). Note: since the indicators are noisy, we show the Hodrick-Prescott filtered values calculated with
smoothing parameter 1, a very low value, to get rid of the short term noise only.
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5.  Note that in the case of
Ireland, there is a significant
difference between Euro-
stat’s intra-euro REER, which
shows a 28 percent real
appreciation from 2000Q1
to 2008Q2, and our REER,
which indicates an appreci-
ation of 9 percent only. The
major reason for this dis-
crepancy is that Eurostat
considers the total econ-
omy, while we consider only
business sectors excluding
agriculture, construction
and real estate, and we also
exclude the impacts of com-
positional changes. As
shown by Darvas (2012b),
ULC rose massively in the
public sector and signifi-
cantly in the construction
industry and real estate, yet
neither the public sector, nor
construction nor real estate
matter directly for export
performance and hence our
indicator is preferable. From
2008Q2 to 2011Q4 the dif-
ference is smaller: Euro-
stat’s intra-euro REER
indicates an 18 percent real
depreciation, while our REER
indicates a 14 percent fall.
6. France and Italy are larger
than Spain and they also
used to have current
account deficits, but their
deficits were much smaller
than in Spain (Figure 1) and
their net international
investment position is much
more favourable than in
Spain (Figure 2).
7. The reduction in trade
deficits during the crisis may
not reflect an improved
competitive position, but can
be the result of demand
compression and the
consequent forced reduction
in imports. This effect may
disappear once the economy
has returned to normal
(which unfortunately seems
still to be far away in
southern Europe). While the
impact of demand
compression on imports
depends on the product
structure as well, which
REER (the cumulative increase form 2000Q1 to
2011Q4 is 10 percent);
• The Irish intra-euro REER has depreciated
sharply during the past few years, even if it has
started to appreciate recently5.
But the middle and right hand panels of Figure 4
show that the non-euro EU and the extra-EU REERs
are still much higher than in 2000, even though
some depreciation, fuelled by the depreciation of
the euro, can be observed in all countries.
4 THE ROLE OF EXTRA-EURO TRADE
Figure 5 shows the balances of trade in goods and
current accounts of Spain and Germany, the euro
area's largest main deficit and surplus countries6.
Bilateral current accounts are generally not
available, but bilateral trade balances are. In a
number of countries, including Spain and
Germany, bilateral trade balances account for a
significant portion of the current account balance.
In 2006 and 2007, the last good years before the
crisis, Spain’s trade deficit with partners outside
the EU was even slightly higher than the trade
deficit with euro-area partners – the same can be
said about German trade surpluses. Also, Germany
had a sizeable surplus with non-euro EU countries.
After 2007, intra-euro trade balances adjusted
significantly: Spain’s deficit and Germany’s
surplus with the rest of the euro-area have
declined substantially toward zero. Yet Spain’s
overall trade deficit remained sizeable, about 5
percent of GDP7. It is also interesting to observe
that Germany was able to increase her surplus
with non-EU countries, partly compensating for
the reduction of the surplus with EU countries. As
a consequence, in 2011, 70 percent of the
German trade surplus came from extra-EU trade,
23 percent from non-euro EU members, and less
than 7 percent from euro-area members.
The shift from intra-euro area to extra-euro area
trade can also be detected in gross trade numbers
(Table 3). In 2011, euro-area partners accounted
for 53 percent of Spanish exports and 38 percent
of German exports. As we show in Table 4, the
proportion of Greek exports going to euro-area
partners is even lower at 29 percent.
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Figure 5: Trade balance with diﬀerent regions, and the current account balance (% GDP), 1999-2011
Source and note: Bilateral goods trade data was collected from Eurostat’s External Trade database. Since the export of coun-
try A to country B, as reported by A, typically does not equal the import of country B from country A, as reported by B, we aver-
aged all bilateral trade flows in order to have a consistent database. Trade balance (TB) with different regions was calculated
using this corrected trade-flow data. The current account balance (CAB) is from Eurostat’s balance of payments database.
Spain Germany
Exports Imports Exports Imports
1999 61 60 45 48
2007 57 53 42 45
2011 53 47 38 43
Table 3: Intra-euro trade as % of total trade
Source: author’s calculations using the sources and method-
ology described in the note to Figure 5. Note: trade within the
first 12 euro-area members is considered.
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differs somewhat
considering intra-euro and
extra-euro imports, the
different pattern of the
Spanish trade deficit across
the main geographical
dimensions is striking.
8. The ECB and the IMF
published several studies
on the methodology of
exchange rate assessment,
see eg Bussière et al
(2010) and Isard (2007).
9. The FEER and BEER are
two popular methods for
calculating the equilibrium
values of real exchange
rates. The FEER approach
aims to identify the
exchange rate that would
achieve both the external
balance (eg the current
account moves to its long-
term sustainable target)
and internal balance (eg
zero output gap). The BEER
approach links the real
exchange rate to a set of
economic fundamentals in
an econometric model and
calculates the equilibrium
rate by plugging in the long-
term values of the funda-
mentals into the estimated
equations. See eg Égert and
Halpern (2006).
10. The Balassa-Samuelson
effect is based on the fol-
lowing principles: while the
prices of tradable goods
should still broadly
equalise due to interna-
tional trade (yet lower local
distributional costs make
the retail prices of tradeable
goods somewhat lower),
lower productivity implies
lower wages in the tradable
sector. Since wages and
profits should equalise
between the tradable and
non-tradable sectors also
within a country, the price
level of non-tradables
should be lower and there-
fore the overall price level
should also be lower in a
lower productivity country
than in her higher produc-
tivity trading partner.  
5 THE EQUILIBRIUM RATE OF THE EURO
We have established in the previous section that
extra-euro trade is becoming more important, both
in terms of gross flows and balances, and
therefore the euro’s exchange rate can have
relevance. What can be said about the equilibrium
value of the euro considering the whole area? Was
it in a close-to-equilibrium position, as the overall
euro area's close-to-balanced external current
account position might suggest? 
Certainly, the heterogeneity of developments
indicated by the left panel of Figure 4 makes it
very difficult to interpret the equilibrium rate of the
euro. This may explain why we could not identify
any European Central Bank, European
Commission or International Monetary Fund
estimates for the euro area. European Commission
(2009) reported estimates for intra-euro
misalignments, but not for the overall
misalignment of the euro8.
Bénassy-Quéré et al (2008) presented estimates
for the euro’s equilibrium exchange rate,
considering the concepts of the fundamental
equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) and the
behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER)9.
For both concepts they made various
assumptions. According to their estimates, in
2005 the range of the overvaluation of the euro’s
real effective exchange rate was between 6.3 and
46.9 percent considering FEER and 4.7 and 9.5
percent considering BEER. The range for the FEER
is very wide, indicating that results are really
sensitive to the actual assumptions made. Yet all
estimates suggest that the euro was overvalued
in 2005. They found that the estimated
equilibrium net IIP of the euro area was close to
zero in 2005, while the actual value was about
minus 10 percent of GDP.
Between 2005 and 2008 the euro’s IIP worsened
(Figure 2), largely due to valuation changes, and
its REER appreciated further. Therefore, the euro’s
overall exchange rate was likely to have been
‘The heterogeneity of real exchange rate developments among euro-area members makes it
very difficult to interpret the equilibrium rate of the euro. Yet available estimates suggest that
the euro was overvalued before the crisis.’
even more significantly overvalued in 2008. Cline
and Williamson (2008) also concluded that euro
was overvalued.
According to European Commission (2009), the
intra-euro REER of Germany was about 10 percent
undervalued and the intra-euro REERs of Greece,
Portugal and Spain were more than 10 percent
overvalued in 2008. Combining these intra-euro
misalignment estimates with the overall
overvaluation of the euro, in 2008 Germany likely
faced a small overall overvaluation, while Greece,
Portugal and Spain very significant
overvaluations.
Since 2008 the euro’s overall REER has
depreciated and the net IIP improved somewhat –
again the improvement is largely due to valuation
changes, as shown by Table 7.3 of European
Central Bank (2012). The euro’s depreciation
implies that Germany now likely faces an
undervalued REER, but Greece, Portugal and Spain
continue to face an overvalued overall rate, though
less than in 2008.
Another measure of the equilibrium rate is
purchasing power parity (PPP): price levels of
goods and services should equalise between
countries with the same productivity level, up to a
small margin reflecting tariffs, transportation
costs and frictions related to labour and factor
movements and price equalisations. In a country
with lower productivity than her trading partner,
the price level should be lower due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect10.
Figure 6 on the next page compares the actual
nominal exchange rate between the euro
(weighted average of the original 11 euro
members before 1999) and the US dollar with the
PPP exchange rate, ie the rate that would equalise
the price levels of GDP between the euro area and
the US.
Since the euro-area’s productivity was broadly
stable at about 70-75 percent of the productivity
Zsolt Darvas  INTRA-EURO REBALANCING IS INEVITABLE, BUT INSUFFICIENT
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of the US from the early 1970s, the price level
should had been lower, ie the actual exchange rate
should have been below the PPP exchange rate.
However, Figure 6 shows that there were a number
of periods, including 2003-2011, when the actual
exchange rate was even above the PPP rate. This
evidence lends further support to the conclusion
that the euro’s exchange rate was likely
overvalued.
It is also noteworthy that the actual rate was well
below the PPP rate in the 1960s, when Europe was
catching up fast. Certainly, the main driver of
catching-up during this period was not the low
nominal exchange rate relative to the PPP rate, but
the rebuilding of the capital stock lost during the
war, technological catching-up and economic
integration efforts (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry,
2011). But at least the exchange rate likely did not
hinder Europe’s catching-up.
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Figure 6: Euro exchange rate against the US dollar and the purchasing power parity (PPP)
conversion rate, January 1960 - July 2012
Source: author’s calculations using data from the OECD (PPP exchange rates), IMF and ECB (actual exchange rates) and IMF
and World Bank (GDP). Note: the PPP exchange rate is the time-varying weighted average of the actual members of the euro
area after 1999 and the original eleven euro members before 1999. The weights are changed annually and are derived from
the given year’s distribution of GDP among euro-area members after 1999 and among the original eleven euro members before
1999. For the actual exchange rate, the euro’s rate is shown from 1999, while before the time-varying weighted average of the
nominal exchange rate of the original eleven euro members, which were normalised by the fixed conversion rate (eg the
Deutsche Mark’s rate is divided by 1.95583, the Spanish peseta’s rate is divided by 166.386, etc). A 12-month moving aver-
age is used to derive the monthly weights from the annual weights. The main reason for the changing actual exchange rate in
the 1960s is the time varying nature of the weights. In an earlier version of this chart (Darvas, 2010b) we used the PPP
exchange rates from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, which resulted in somewhat lower values, eg 1.18 for 2010 instead
of the 1.24 value derived from OECD data as shown in this figure.
6 HOW TO FOSTER FURTHER REAL EXCHANGE
RATE ADJUSTMENT?
The simple decomposition of the REER presented
in Darvas (2012b) shows that REER depreciation
can occur through domestic ULC declines (which
in turn can be achieved by productivity
improvements and nominal wage falls), ULC
increases of trading partners, and nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER) depreciations.
• The domestic adjustment capacity is reflected
in domestic productivity and wage
developments: the former should increase
relative to the latter. Since 2008, significant
adjustment has been achieved, especially in
Ireland and Spain (Figure 4). However,
productivity improvements came about largely
through reducing labour input, but nominal
wages barely declined in Ireland and did not
decline in Spain, despite huge unemployment,
implying downward wage rigidity (Darvas,
2012a). These developments underline the
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difficulties and pain in domestic ULC
reductions.
• There is a strong case for calling for ULC
increases in the ‘northern’ euro-area trading
partners, see for example De Grauwe (2012),
Wolff (2012), and Merler and Pisani-Ferry
(2012)11. To some extent wage increases have
started in Germany, but in any case this
process will take a long time. ULC increases of
non-euro area trading partners would help as
well, but this is clearly beyond the scope of
international policy coordination.
• In their elegant analytical paper, Merler and
Pisani-Ferry (2012) also demonstrate that
reducing the pace of fiscal adjustment in the
northern members of the euro area would
facilitate the REER adjustment of the southern
members12. They also show that structural
reforms which make wages more responsive to
unemployment in southern Europe would
facilitate intra-euro REER adjustment.
Unfortunately, the relaxation of fiscal targets in
northern Europe does not seem to be on the
agenda, and it will take a long time before
structural reforms in southern Europe take
effect.
• Members of the euro area do not have
individual exchange rates, and the exchange
rate of the euro is not under the control of
national policymakers. But the European
Central Bank could implement measures which
affect the exchange rate of the euro.
The key issue is if further adjustments in real
exchange rates and trade balances should be
treated as a purely intra-euro story, or if
policymakers should also seek to depreciate the
euro.
The evidence we presented underline that a purely
intra-euro strategy has limits, since the share of
intra-euro trade in total trade is not that high (Table
3) and intra-euro trade balances have corrected to
a great extent (Figure 5), along with the intra-euro
REERs of the four euro-area countries with close
to minus 100 percent of GDP net IIP (Figure 4).
Figure 1 also indicates that by 2011 there were
only three main current account surplus
countries: Germany, the Netherlands and small
Luxembourg. If eg, the intra-euro trade surplus of
Spain is to compensate for her extra-euro trade
deficit, then further adjustment in intra-euro
REERs should be very significant and therefore
there should be an ‘overcompensation’ from the
German and Dutch side, with wages and prices
rising much faster in these two main remaining
surplus countries, which would be resisted.
Also, as Wolff (2012) lucidly argued, if the ECB
keeps the 2 percent inflation target and price
developments sooner or later follow wage
developments, than the much faster German and
Dutch wage increases would require an ever more
significant wage deflation in southern Europe,
which may or may not be desirable, but does not
seem to be feasible, given the downward wage
rigidity observed in high unemployment countries
(Darvas, 2012a).
The secondary effects of a purely intra-euro
adjustment can be small, and at best time
consuming. Intra-euro rebalancing, eg fast wage
increases in Germany and stable or even declining
wages in Spain, would make Spain more
competitive with respect to all trading partners,
not just with Germany, and the Spanish position
relative to Germany could improve in other
markets too. But changing wages is a gradual
process, even if fostered by labour market reforms
in Spain.
Therefore, there is a strong case for pushing for a
weaker euro (not just against the US dollar, but in
nominal effective terms), in addition to continued
intra-euro rebalancing. This would not solve the
euro’s crisis on its own, but would help to address
intra-euro rebalancing as well:
1 The weaker euro would help Spain and other
southern euro-area members to rebalance their
extra-euro trade deficits and to foster the
development of their tradable sectors. There is
certainly a hope that the tradable sector can
respond to a weaker exchange rate, since
Spanish exports are performing the best among
the first 12 members of the euro since 2008, in
line with the real exchange rate adjustment
achieved so far (right panel of Figure 3). 
2 But northern countries, like Germany would
most likely benefit even more than southern
European countries: according to the estimates
presented in Bussière et al (2010), Germany’s
11. A main difference
between De Grauwe (2012)
and Wolff (2012) is that De
Grauwe (2012) claims that
adjustment has been asym-
metric in recent years,
while Wolff (2012) argues
that it has been symmetric
but insufficient. Conse-
quently, De Grauwe (2012)
calls for a stronger wage
increase in the northern
euro-area countries only,
while Wolff (2012) argues
that if the ECB is to keep its
2 percent inflation target
and wage developments
feed inflation, then a higher
wage increase in the north
is only feasible if wages fall
much more in the south.
12. In Darvas (2010a) I
have likewise argued that
premature fiscal
consolidation at the euro-
area level will have several
side effects, of which one is
that it will make it much
harder to reduce intra-euro
area current account
imbalances.
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exports are the most price sensitive among the
euro-area countries that they consider. Also,
the share of Germany's tradable sector in total
output is among the highest (Table 4). Boosting
German extra-euro exports and its trade
surplus would also help intra-euro rebalancing
by fostering faster German wage increases
because of the tight labour market conditions
(Siegel, 2012; Feldstein 2012). In contrast,
because of high unemployment, the weaker
euro may not result in much increase in wages
and prices in southern Europe.
A weaker euro would push the whole euro area into
an external surplus, thereby worsening global
imbalances. Ideally, emerging economies with
current account surpluses should let their
currencies appreciate against the euro, making
room for the euro-area to have an external surplus.
Yet fiscal expansion in northern Europe, or at least
a slower pace of consolidation, could reduce the
euro-area external surplus (Darvas, 2010a).
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have argued that the external solvency of
Greece, Portugal and Spain is at risk and the
perceived inability of these countries to rebalance
their external positions is a major root of the euro
crisis. While intra-euro rebalancing should
continue, a purely intra-euro rebalancing strategy
has limits and there is a strong case for a weaker
euro. The best policy mix to foster further
rebalancing would be:
• Wage decline in southern Europe (which is not
really happening);
• Higher wage increases in northern Europe
(which seems to be happening to some extent
at least in Germany, but will be a slow process);
• Structural reforms to foster wage adjustment in
southern Europe (which require a long time to
take effect);
• Fiscal expansion in northern Europe, or at least
a significant slowdown in the pace of fiscal
consolidation (which does not seem to come);
• Policies to weaken the euro.
What could engineer a fall in the exchange rate of
the euro? 
An escalation of the euro crisis could do this job
but this is not the way to go. 
The ECB could and should play a role. Clearly, the
ECB’s mandate is to maintain price stability, but
Destination of goods exports (% total)
Current
account
balance
(% GDP)
Net inter-
national
investment
position
(% GDP)
Exports of
goods and
services
(% GDP)
Manufac-
turing
value
added
(% total)
Euro area
12 (mem-
bers 1999-
2001)
Euro area 5
(new mem-
bers 2007-
2011)
Non-euro
area EU
Non EU
Netherlands 9.2 37 83 12.7 61 1 15 23
Luxembourg 7.1 101 165 6.9 67 1 14 19
Germany 5.7 36 50 22 38 2 19 41
Austria 1.9 -6 57 18.9 49 4 17 30
Ireland 0.1 -102 106 25.8 40 0 20 40
Finland -0.7 14 39 18.2 29 3 24 44
Belgium -0.8 63 85 14.1 58 1 13 29
France -2.2 -11 27 10.5 47 1 12 39
Italy -3.2 -22 29 15.9 40 2 13 45
Spain -3.5 -92 30 13.4 53 1 12 35
Portugal -6.4 -103 35 13 63 0 10 27
Greece -9.8 -79 24 9.9 29 7 15 49
Table 4: External positions, export and manufacturing shares, and the geographical distribution of
exports, 2011
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Eurostat. Note: countries are ordered according to the current account balance
in 2011.
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price stability is not in danger now. Current
debates about the ECB’s monetary policy focus on
its possible role in limiting government bond
spreads of euro-area member states through
massive bond purchases, a debate that gained
momentum after the 26 July 2012 speech of
President Draghi (Draghi, 2012). President Draghi
said that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes
to preserve the euro” and hinted ECB intervention
in bond markets by saying that “to the extent that
the size of these sovereign premia hampers the
functioning of the monetary policy transmission
channel, they come within our mandate”.
Speculation about such interventions has led to a
modest appreciation of the euro and if actually
implemented, could push up the euro even more.
Therefore, the ECB should also consider
supplementary policies to achieve a weaker euro
by a more accommodative monetary policy
stance, which would anyway be justified in a
highly recessionary environment. The 11 July
2012 interest rate cuts13 were immediately
followed by a depreciation of the euro. More rate
cuts would have similar effects, especially if
accompanied by a commitment to keep the rates
low for a longer period, as the Federal Reserve
announced14. Other options, such as quantitative
easing, should also be considered.
How could global partners react? The US, China
and other major players, which all have brighter
economic outlooks than the euro area, should
recognise that the euro was overvalued for several
years in the second half of the 2000s. The best
they can do to help the resolution of the euro crisis
is not lending more money, but allowing the euro
to become undervalued for some years. Helping
the resolution of the euro crisis is in their interests
as well.
13. On 11 July 2012 the
ECB cut the main refinanc-
ing rate from 1.00 percent
to 0.75 percent, the mar-
ginal lending rate from 1.75
percent to 1.5 percent, and
the rate of the deposit facil-
ity form 0.25 percent to
zero percent.
14. “The Committee also
decided to keep the target
range for the federal funds
rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and
currently anticipates that
economic conditions –
including low rates of
resource utilization and a
subdued outlook for infla-
tion over the medium run –
are likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels for the
federal funds rate at least
through mid-2013” (Federal
Reserve, 2011). In more
recent statements, eg the
statement of 1 August
2012, “the exceptionally
low levels for the federal
funds rate” are expected to
persist “at least through
late 2014”.
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